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McLeod: The Flags-of-Convenience Problem

NOTES
THE FLAGS-OF-CONVENIENCE PROBLEM
Although some scholars regard Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) as
the father of international law, the better view, it would seem, is
that Grotius supplied ". . . not a system of law, but a philosophy
of inter-state relations .... ,11
Grotius' philosophy evolved the traditional international legal
principle of freedom of the seas for the maintenance of the public order at sea. In modern times, however, the philosophy of
Grotius, with respect to the sea, maintains a concern more basic
than and different from traditional sea law. The present problem at sea is within world maritime commerce and trade and
consists of the international competition prevalent in the shipping industry. Because this problem is economic rather than
legal, there is some question whether the traditional philosophy
of Grotius should accord a solution.
The problem of international shipping competition manifests
itself in the legal complications that arise from the national
character attributed to merchant vessels operated by the industry.
The crux is that certain nations foster the registration under
their flags of foreign-owned ships. The flags of these nations,
known as "flags of convenience," presently confront the philosophy of Grotius with one of its most acute twentieth century
problems.
The most accessible flags of convenience are those of Panama,
Liberia, and Honduras, who represent approximately thirty-six
per cent of all privately owned American merchant ship tonnage.
Such flag of convenience registration enables the American shipowner to reduce his operating costs by avoiding requirements
that American-flag vessels employ American seamen, either be
repaired in American shipyards or pay a penalty of fifty per
cent of the value of the repairs made elsewhere, and undergo
periodic Coast Guard inspections requiring high maintenance
standards. By avoiding these costly requirements, the American
flag of convenience operator-employing alien crews, decreasing
maintenance standards, and repairing his vessel abroad-pays
from one-third to one-fifth American wages and reduces maintenance and repair bills by about twenty-five per cent for a total
operating cost reduction of about one-half. 2
1. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (2d Ed. 1962).
2. Comment, The Effect of U. S. Labor Legislation on the Flag-of-Convenience Fleet, 69 YALE L. J. 498, 500 (1960).
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Although the greatest concentration of foreign flag operations
involve American-owned ships, flag of convenience shipping
represents about fifteen per cent of the world's merchant tonnage. Thus, flags of convenience are an international economic
problem. However, because there is no real connection between
the countries that provide flags of convenience and the ships
that use them, opponents of flags of convenience fleets construe
the problem as an uncertainty that is unfavorable to the sea's
public order. Allegedly, the connection is merely a matter of
form. As stated by the Oslo Shipowners Association in 1958:
Because the shipping registered under their flags does not
pay tax, these countries are unable to make any reasonable
contribution to the defense of western civilization and the
freedom of the seas. In these uncertain times, when preparedness is essential, large merchant fleets sailing under
the flags of countries outside the general control, constitute
an element of uncertainty that must not be underestimated.,
As participants in the shipping industry's international competition, the Oslo Shipowners admitted their inability to remedy
the flags of convenience situation and concluded that the problem is "soluble only at government level-national or international."14
The basic dilemma in the flags of convenience problem on the
national level is the conflict between the "inclusive interests" of
the maritime nation (such as free commercial navigation) and
the "exclusive interests" which that nation seeks to protect. More
specifically, the dilemma in the United States consists of the
inclusive principles of comity embodied in international law in
contradistinction to the exclusive interest in the welfare of
American labor. American labor unions maintain that because
of American-owned flags of convenience vessels, the employment
of American seamen continues to decrease. The unions also claim
that because of this decrease, pay scales and working conditions
on board American-flag ships will deteriorate and that because
of the relationship between a strong merchant mariners' force
and the defense of a nation, the security of the United States
may be diminished. However, thus far, the American labor movement has sought unsuccessfully the passage of remedial legislation by Congress.
3. Harolds, Some Legal Problens Arising Out of Foreign Flag Operations,
FoRDHAm L. REv. 295, 313 (1959).
4. Ibid.
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After gaining no assistance from the United States government, the unions turned directly on the flags of convenience
fleets with an attempt to unionize and obtain American wage
scales for seamen serving aboard these foreign-registered vessels.
In this attempt to organize, the unions sought the aegis of the
National Labor Relations Act. This statute grants the Labor
Board power to resolve "questions of representation" when "commerce" is affected.5 Commerce is defined to include that ".

.

. be-

tween any foreign country and any state, territory, or the District of Columbia." 6 Thus, arguably, only those ships that never
enter United States ports are specifically excluded from coverage
under the act. Such an interpretation of a national law would
obviously be in opposition to international law doctrine. However, based on still another theory--that of "substantial contacts"
with American interests-the Labor Board in the United Fruit
Co. 7 decision, found that it had jurisdiction of a foreign corporation's maritime operations that encompassed transportation and
trade between foreign countries and states of the United States,
despite foreign registry of the vessels and the foreign-national
status of the seamen employed. Thus, because of the underlying
stock or other beneficial ownership resulting in ultimate control
of a foreign corporation and its operations by domestic United
States interests, the Labor Board found American-owned foreign-flag operations within the coverage of the NLRA and
directed a representation election for seamen employed within
such operations. On appeal, the Labor Board finding was reversed by the Supreme Court which held that assertion of United
States jurisdiction by the Labor Board over flags of convenience
ships employing alien seamen would require a clearly expressed
affirmative intention of Congress. The Court found no such
intention and therefore held that the Labor Board was without
jurisdiction, in view of the well established rule of international
law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal
affairs of such a ship.8
As a result of this decision, the Labor Board is without jurisdiction to administer elections on flag of convenience ships, to
qualify a union as the seamen's bargaining agent, or to prevent
unfair employer labor practices. Thus, practically speaking,
5. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT §§ 9(c) (1), 10(a), as amended, 61 STAT.
144, 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1958).
6. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT § 2 (6), as amended, 61 STAT. 138, 29
U.S.C. § 152 (1958).

7.49 L.R.R.M. 1138 (1961).
8. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineras, 52 L. R. R. M. 2425 (1963).
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American labor unions are reduced to a position where they are
unable to organize seamen on board flag of convenience ships.
Therefore, until there is congressional modification of the
NLRA, the restrictive policy of the courts toward the Labor
Board, the unsupportable desires of American labor, and the
unassailable position of the flags of convenience fleets will
continue.
The Supreme Court's decision was entirely proper. For the
Labor Board to extend United States jurisdiction to the internal
affairs of American-owned flag of convenience vessels would
be a breach of the international law principles, founded on comity of nations, that the Court has traditionally sought to protect.
Admittedly, Congress has the constitutional power to apply
United States jurisdiction to crews working foreign ships while
in American waters. However, as long ago as The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon9 the Court held that foreign ships are
granted an implied consent by the United States to enjoy immunity from our jurisdiction. The principles of comity-primarily, freedom of access-that demanded the Schooner Exchange
decision are equally applicable today. Such principles represent
the inclusive interests of the whole American people, and it
would seem that these inclusive interests prevail over the exclusive interests of America-the welfare of the American seamen, represented by the American labor movement.
We now consider flags of convenience from an international
viewpoint. Whereas nationally, the labor movement is virtually
the only adversary to foreign flag operations, internationally
both the unions and foreign shipowners continue to exert pressure in opposition to PanLibHon "runaway" shipping. The
unions and the shipowners contend that the flags of convenience
countries maintain no effective jurisdiction over their ships, have
not developed a mercantile legal system, have no rational method
for recruiting their own seamen, no officer-training institutions,
no effective ship control, and allow their ships to operate essentially tax-free. Because foreign flag operations are the manifestations of competition within the world shipping industry, and
because national solutions have thus far failed to be forthcoming,
the unions and foreign shipowners have sought a solution from
international law and the law of the sea.
For many years, the law of nations has clearly indicated that
a ship is regarded as belonging to the country that registered
9. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 114 (1812).
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the ship. 10 Specifically, international law has traditionally left
each individual nation to determine under what conditions it
will register and thereby confer its nationality upon a ship. In
1958, the United States Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larson,"
re-affirmed the United States' concurrence with the above international law principles. The Court held that each state under
international law may determine for itself the conditions requisite for granting its nationality to a ship, as evidenced to the
world by the ship's papers and national flag. The Court concluded that the United States has firmly and successfully maintained that the regularity and validity of registration can be
questioned only by the registering state.' 2 These principles have
evolved over many years, the result of a multitude of sea crises.
Paramount in their solution was the maintenance of the public
order of the seas. Almost as significant as freedom of the sea
vis a 'visthe public order thereof, has been the established right
of nations to confer national character upon vessels, based on
self-determined criteria.
Notwithstanding traditional international legal principles, the
International Law Commission submitted a radically new concept of international law to the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva in 1958. While adhering to
the traditional principles that "Each state shall fix the conditions for the granting of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its
flag," 13 Article 5 of the Geneva Convention substantially confirms the new concept of the I.L.C.:
.. .there must exist a genuine link between the State and
the ship . . .the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical, and social
14
matters over ships flying its flag.
Supported by the traditionally maritime nations-Norway,
Sweden, the Netherlands, Britain, and Italy-representing the
non-American shipowners and the International Labor Organization, representing the unions, the "link" requirement was adopted
by the Geneva Conference and became a new, yet unratified
element of the international law of the sea. The United States
10. 5 HuDsoN, INTERNATIONAL LEISLATioN 639 (1936).
11. 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1958).
12. Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1958).

13. Jessup, U. N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 59 CoLuSI. L. REV. 234,
255 (1959).
14. Jessup, .supra note 13, at 256.
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ratified the Convention on March 21, 1961, but as of January 12,
1962, neither the "link" theory nor the Convention were effective for lack of required ratification by twenty-two nations.
As previously mentioned, the "link" innovation for the identification of the national character of ships was stimulated by the
interested pressure groups-the unions and the interested foreign
shipowners. However, this innovation owes its inspiration to the
International Court of Justice, which, three years before the
1958 Geneva Conference, produced a novel and controversial
decision. In 1955, the Court held in the Nottebohm Case' 5 that
Liechtenstein citizenship conferred on a former German national
who had his business interests and residence in Guatemala for
thirty-four years did not correspond with the factual situation
because certain minimum factors necessary for citizenship were
absent. Because of the lack of any "real and effective link" between the nation and its national, the Court denied Nottebohm
the citizenship that Liechtenstein had granted him.
After N'ottebohm, the International Law Commission, encouraged by union and shipowning interests, transplanted the "link"
theory into a dissimilar environment-the law of the sea. Whether this new criterion will ultimately be ratified by the participating nations in the Geneva Conference is unforetold. Whether
the International Court of Justice will utilize the "link" standard
to determine the national character of ships is still another
question.
However, Phillip Jessup predicted in 1959 that"... in light
of the court's opinion in the Nottebohm Case, it is probable that
if the issue were presented to it, that tribunal would sustain the
link theory in its application to the nationality of ships." 16
To date, the "link" theory has not been in issue before the International Court, although the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultive Organization Case17 in 1960 skirted the issue. IMCO
was organized in 1959, and under the convention for the organization's establishment, certain committee seats were reserved for
the "largest ship-owning nations." Two flags of convenience
nations, Panama and Liberia, were not elected to committee membership; and IMCO's assembly asked the International Court for
an advisory opinion as to whether Panama and Liberia were
15. Liechtenstein v. Guatemala [1955], I.CJ. Rep. 4.
16. Jessup, mora note 13, at 256.
17. Advisory Opinion on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee
of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultive Organization [1960], I.CJ.

Rep. 150.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss3/4

6

1961]

McLeod: TheNOTES
Flags-of-Convenience Problem

disenfranchised. In a carefully phrased question that evaded a
test of the "link" theory, the Court held that both nations should
have been chosen to membership on the committee as among the
eight largest ship-owning nations. The Court reasoned this because both nations rank in the top eight in terms of registry and
flag, although actual ownership of many of the vessels concerned
was foreign.
At this point the "link" theory remains in suspension, unratified by the required number of Geneva Conference participants,
circumvented by the International Court, but predicted of probable sustainment by one of the Court's present magistrates.
The writer feels that the "link" theory fostered by the International Law Commission at the behest of union and shipping
interests spokesmen is an unjustified imposition thrust upon the
philosophy of international law. It would seem that the law of
nations is not appropriate for the solution of an economic problem within a particular industry-though world-wide it may be.
Problems of labor are self-evidently different and hardly comparable to the traditional objectives of international law. Better
working conditions, higher wages, increased job opportunities,
and more comprehensive social security are problems whose solutions lie within national boundaries and which have a too distant
relationship to the traditional law of the sea and its objectivethe maintenance of the public order of the sea. Equally true is
that the problems of the shipping interests, principally the maintenance of their competitive position in maritime commerce, are
unfit for solution by the law of nations. These problems are dependent upon taxes, safety regulations, labor legislation, government subsidies, and a nation's international trade, each of which
are national considerations. These factors are matters of economics and politics-matters for national solution and improper
considerations for the law of nations. It would seem that when
a philosophy of law such as the law of nations becomes focused
on the problems of a particular industry, resulting in the upheaval of the traditional right of a state to grant unquestioned
its nationality to ships, only uncertainty and danger can ensue.
The establishment of the "link" principle would grant to each
state the unilateral competence to question or even deny another
state's ascription of nationality to a vessel. Ships without nationality are deemed stateless. Stateless ships are without protection; they are not allowed access to ports; they are considered
suspect of piracy. These are overdrawn possibilities. However,
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they are distinct probabilities if the "link" theory were adopted
as a prevailing principle of international law. The preamble of
the Geneva Convention stipulates that the articles are "generally"
declaratory of international law. Were the Convention ratified
by the required number of nations, the United States Supreme
Court, might find sufficient foundation in the ratification by
the United States to uphold the Labor Board's "substantial contacts" theory. Because the "link" standard would allow the
United States to question another nation's ascription of nationality to a vessel, the Court could hold that American-owned flags
of convenience vessels were essentially American nationality, and
therefore the Labor Board could interfere in the internal affairs
of such ships. Based on these possibilities, the solution to the
flags of convenience problem could be foreseeable. However, we
must remember that these possibilities would, in fact, interfere
with the principles of comity, such as freedom of the seas and
freedom of access, that are essential to world trade and commerce
which all commercial nations seek to protect. More important,
respect for comity principles are requisite for healthy relationships between independent and sovereign nations. Without mutual restraint and appreciation for the inclusive interests that all
ocean trading nations share, the unimpeded flow of ocean commerce, indeed, the maintenance of the public order of the sea
are likely to become far less satisfactory.
Presently the "flags of convenience" problem continues unsolved. The writer has concluded that a solution fraught with
dangers and uncertainties through the law of nations philosophy
is inappropriate. In addition, present United States statutory law
has proved inapplicable. The supreme question beckons its resolution, but where? In the United States, the courts have deferred
the problem to Congress. Here, by the national government, the
writer feels the matter of foreign flag operations rightly should
be resolved-both by the United States and other interested nations. This is because a national level solution is most conducive
to each nation's objective-the maintenance of the public order
of the sea.
In the United States, Congress has continually refused assistance to the unions, who are the prime American opponents of
flags of convenience. However, whether this policy will continue
is not predictable. Conceivably, Congress could amend the present NLRA to include all ships owned or ultimately controlled
by United States interests. But, because of potential foreign
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retaliation and possible international trade disruption resulting
from this seeming over-extension of American labor legislation,
such an amendment is doubtful. Another possible congressional
solution that would virtually eliminate American-owned flags
of convenience shipping would be the application of federal
minimum wage laws to employees on vessels owned or controlled
by American citizens though operating under a foreign flag.
However, this solution would probably produce equal consternation as extension of the Labor Act to include American-owned
foreign flag operations.
Perhaps the most reasonable solution by Congress to Americanowned flags of convenience shipping is the elimination of subsidy proposals. For some years it has been unlawful for one
receiving subsidies to operate any foreign flag vessel that competes with an American-flag service.1 8 This law has proved ineffective against flags of convenience shipping because owners
may operate through foreign corporations ultimately controlled
by Americans. Much more stringent legislation, introduced in
1957, that would have effectively eliminated American-owned
flags of convenience transfers, failed to be enacted by Congress.
Specifically, the proposal would have required Federal government certification, of any vessel to be transferred, that the vessel
would not during its useful life be necessary to the American
merchant marine, and, if transferred, would not be operated in
competition with American-flag ships or be placed in an operation that would release another foreign-flag vessel for such
competition. In addition, this proposal would have denied a
construction-differential subsidy to those persons that own or
operate, or whose affiliate owns or operates any foreign-flag
vessel that competes with an essential American-flag operator. 19
Although this comprehensive bill was unsuccessful, in 1959 the
opponents of flags of convenience received favorable consideration in the House of Representatives for an extension of the present subsidy law. Although unsuccessful in the Senate, this extension would have prohibited granting of operating-differential
subsidies to owners with considerable interests in foreign flag
operations. 20 This proposal, though hardly a panacea to the
flags of convenience problem, would eliminate some American
shipping interests from holding both American-flag and Ameri18. 49 STAT. 2012 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C.

§

1222 (1958).

19. Note, PANLIBHON Registration of American-owned Merchant Ships,
60 CoLum. L. Rxv. 711, 717 (1960).
20. Ibid.
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can-controlled foreign-flag operations. A search of the United
States Code indicates that the subsidy law extension has yet to
be passed by Congress. Essentially, the two elimination-of-subsidy proposals would require that American shipping interests
become either fully American or fully flag of convenience operations. This is a choice few who receive American benefits would
cherish. Many would consider, but few would become fully flag
of convenience operators.
Because the elimination of subsidies is a national solution that
in no way would impair or render uncertain the maintenance
of the public order of the sea, it is the writer's belief that the
subsidies-elimination proposals are presently the most feasible
remedy to the problem of flags of convenience.
WALTON J.
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